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नारायणभट्टपादविरचितम्

अपाणिनीयप्रामाण्यसाधनम्

APĀṆINĪYA – PRĀMĀṆYA – SĀDHANAM

By

NĀRĀYAṆA BHAṬṬAPĀDA

Edited with Introduction, English Translation and Notes
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FOREWORD

The present work *Apāṇinīyaprāmāṇya-sādhanam* issued as No. 2 under 'Texts and Studies' an appendage to *S.V. University Oriental Journal* is a critical edition of a *krodapatra* written by a versatile scholar Melpputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri or Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭapāda. This work is a reply to the dogmatic views of one Vainateya who was supposed to be a contemporary of the author of this work and who avowedly accepted the grammatical works of only Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali as authoritative ones and rejected all others. Thanks to Prof. E.R. Sree-krishna Sarma for preparing a scholarly edition of the work with an English translation and copious notes. The Editor has added an erudite Introduction to the work wherein he summerises the outlines of arguments systematically advanced by the author in favour of accepting the non-Paninian grammars also as authoritative.

TIRUPATI, J. CHENNA REDDY,

Dt. 31–12–1968. GENERAL EDITOR.

INTRODUCTION

The *Apāṇinīyaprāmāṇya-sādhanam* was described under the title *Parapakṣakhaṇḍanam* in the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Curator's Office Library, Trivandrum (1939), No. 475. Through an article under the caption *Oru kattu* (A Letter) in the issue of the *Mathrubhumi* weekly, Calicut, dated 5-2-1939, the late pandit E.V. Rāman Nampūtiri brought to the notice of the public the last portion of the work which is in the form of a covering letter addressed to the scholars of the Coḷa country in general, and one Someśvara Dīkṣita and Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita in particular. Subsequently in 1942 the same scholar brought out an edition of the work with the name *Apāṇiniyapramāṇatā* which was printed in *Devanāgarī* script in the V.V. Press Branch, Trivandrum. It is curious to note that as per the information given on the title page of this edition only 54 copies were printed. The present edition is based on this printed edition (designated R in the foot-notes) and an old transcript of the manuscript described in the Trivandrum Catalogue (designated as Tc in the foot-notes) which was made available to me by Sri M.S.K. Nampūtiri.

The author of this *kroḍapatra* is the well known versatile scholar Melpputtur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri who flourished between 1560 and 1666 A.D.[1] Thus, he was a contemporary of the renowned scholars of Coḷadeśa, like the celebrated Appayya Dīkṣita, Veṅkaṭeśa Makhin and Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita, although there seems to be no full knowledge of the works of Bhaṭṭatiri in Coḷadeśa and the works of the Coḷa scholars in Kerala at that time.

The *kroḍapatra* is a reply to the dogmatic views of one Vainateya who held that the grammatical works other than of the trinity of sages, namely, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali were not authoritative. In the grammatical work *Prakriyāsarvasva* Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri has accepted the authority of the grammars of non-Paninian school. Particularly Bhoja, the author of the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* and *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* was held by him in high esteem and he has even copied some sections of the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* in his own grammatical work (e.g. the *Nyāyakhaṇḍa* in the *Prakriyāsarvasva*.),

1. K.K. Raja: *The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, p. 130.

One may imagine that seeing the *Prakriyāsarvasva*, the Vainateya Paṇḍita in question might have challenged the acceptance of non-Paninian views by Bhaṭṭatiri ; but there is yet no support to this imagination. If we could unearth some work which avowedly denies the authenticity of non-Paninian works, we may be able to understand the situation under which Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri wrote this *kroḍapatra*.

The work is unique in the sense that there is no other treatise found so far devoting itself to the task of proving the authority of non-Paninian grammars through systematic argumentation, although the ideas expressed herein are found scattered in the works of the trinity of Sages, the *Vākyapadīya* and in the works of the grammarians down to Bhojadeva. The main idea presented here is that the scope of language is wider and the grammar is only an aid to undrestand the correctness of usages. Many noted writers have used forms which are not noticed by Pāṇini and his followers. Are we to reject those usages as incorrect because rules for them are not found in the Paninian grammar? Or shall we consider those usages as correct and acceptable even to Pāṇini though not noticed by him? The fanatics would answer the first question in the affirmative, and this treatise is a fitting answer to them. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri is of course a votary of the Paninian school. He maintains that Paninian rules are the clearest and the briefest of the Sanskrit grammars. But he would not admit that the other grammars are therefore non-authoritative. For the grammar is for explaining and codifying the language, whereas language is too wide to be restricted by grammatical rules.

Beginning from Kaiyyaṭa upto Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, there has been a tendency to reject the authority of the non-Paninan grammars and to show forcibly that the forms which are not found in the rules of the trinity of the sages can be somehow or other pressed out of their works. In this process even the religion of the authors has been brought to play a part. For example, the incorporation of some rules of Candragomin in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* was resented by the votaries of the trinity of sages. The author of the *Nyāsa* has been criticized sometimes very severely, presumably on the grouud that he was a Jaina although his work is one of the best in the Paninian system. This narrowness of outlook in the academic matters is what is not favoured by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri. Of course, his teacher, the celebrated grammarian and astronomer Acyuta Piṣāroṭi had already shown this broad outlook in his excellet manual on grammar the *Praveśaka* Bhaṭṭatiri has however given us a well-reasoned treatise vindicating this broad outlook and liberality through this *kroḍapatra*.

The Vainateya whose views criticised in this *kroḍapatra* is yet to be identified. Appākavi or Periyappā Śāstri, the author of the *Śṛṅgāra Sāhajīyam*[2], says that his uncle as well as one of his brothers is Vainateya. Dr. V. Raghavan states that there were several Vainateyas.[3] But until the treatise which has been criticised in this *kroḍapatra* is known we are unable to identify the Vainateya in question. Appākavi's father Aṇṇā Sāstri is said to have been in the court of Veṅkaṭapatirāya of Vijayanagar[4]. His brother Vainateya is said to have written a commentary on the *Prakāśa* (most probably Rucidatta's commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*).[5] This Vainateya must be then a contemporary of Nārāyaṇa Baṭṭatiri. But it is not yet known whether he was maintaining the view that the non-Paninian grammars were not authoritative.

The covering letter at the end of the *kroḍapatra* is addressed to one Someśvara Dīkṣita and Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita. The former is still to be identified while the latter must be the scholar minister of Raghunātha Nāyak of Tanjore[6]. It is also mentioned here that the Someśvara Dikṣita was a scholar of deep erudition in Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Tarka and he wrote a work *Kāmadeva-vijaya* and vanquished one Kāmadeva. The prologue to the *Śṛṅgāra Sāhajīyam* referred to above mentions that Aṇṇan Śāstri vanquished one Kāmadeva in the court of Veṅkaṭapatirāya. Aṇṇan Sāstri's other name was Cidambara according to M. Krishnamachary,[7] but his identity with Someśvara is still unknown. Ullūr S. Paramieswara Aiyar[8] identifies this Someśvara with the author of Rāghavayādavīyam[9], but no proof is given to substantiate his statement. The nature of the work *Kāmadeva-vijaya* is also not known. Was it a treatise on Grammar, or Mīmāṃsā or Tarka?[10] This point is not clear from the reference in this *kroḍapatra*.

The works of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri deserve to be known more widely. It is hopped that the present edition with the English translation and notes will prove to be usefull to the students of Sanskrit in general and of Sanskrit grammar in particuiar.

2. Described under R.No. 1843 in the Madras Government Oriental MSS Library Catalogues.
3. See foot-note No. 3 of the translation of the present work.
4. Vide R No. 1843 of the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library Catalogue. According to *New Catalogus Catalogorum* this was Veṅkaṭapati III who ruled from 1632-42
5. ibid.
6. The last but one verse of the covering letter indicates this. Raghunātha Nāyak ruled between 1614 and 1633
7. *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, p. 245.
8. *Kerala Sāhitya Caritram*, vol II p.390.
9. This author's family name was *Viñjimūri*. He was a desciple of one Dvivedī. See R.No. 1859 of Madras Govt. Oriental Mss Library Catalogue.
10. According to *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. III. p. 348, it is a grammatical work.

IMPORTANT NOTE

Page ४ para १३ sentence 5 of the Sanskrit Text may be read as follows :

ननु पतञ्जलेः सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वात् कथं तद्वचनबाध इति चेत्। तर्हि व्यासादेरपि सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वात् तद्वचनबाधाभावाय व्याकरणान्तरमपि प्राप्तम्।

Page 19, para 13 sentence 3 of the Translation may be read as :

[Objection :] Because Patañjali is the best of all (i.e., the three sages) how can his words be annulled?

[Answer :] In that case because Vyāsa, etc., are vlso the best among all, in order to avoid the annulment of their words other grammars (than those of the trinity of sages) are also to be anticipated.

Foot-note No. 33 on page 19 may be treated as cancelled.

[These corrections are necessiated as the result of my opportunity to see for myself the original MS. of the work after the printing of the pages is over. I crave the indulgence of scholars in this matter.]

E. R. S. S.

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अपाणिनीयप्रामाण्यसाधनम्

सुदर्शनसमालम्बी सोऽहं नारायणोऽधुना ।
वैनतेय भवत्पक्षमाक्रम्य स्थातुमारभे ॥

तत्रायं संग्रहः –

पाणिन्युक्तं प्रमाणं न तु पुनरपरं चन्द्रभोजादिशास्त्रं [1]
केऽप्याहुस्तल्लघिष्ठं न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूलवाक्यम् ।
बह्वङ्गीकारभेदो भवति गुणवशात्, पाणिनेः प्राक् कथं वा ?
पूर्वोक्ति [2] पाणिनिश्चाप्यनुवदति, विरोधेऽपि कल्प्यो विकल्पः ॥

१. अत्र तावद् 'इन्द्रचन्द्रकाशकृत्स्नापिशलिशाकटायनादिपुरातनाचार्यरचितानां व्याकरणानामप्रमाणत्वमेव, मुनित्रयोक्तस्यैव तु प्रामाण्यम्' इति केचित् पण्डितंमन्या मन्यन्ते । तदपहसनीयमेव; चन्द्रादिवचसामनाप्तप्रणीतत्वाभावेन प्रामाण्यनिश्चयात् । पुरुषवचसामप्रामाण्यं तावदनाप्तप्रणीतत्वहेतुकमेवेति चन्द्रादिशास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यं वदद्भिस्तेषामनाप्तत्वे प्रमाणं वक्तव्यम् ॥

२. तत्र तेषामनाप्तत्वं तावत् प्रत्यक्षतो न लक्ष्यते । 'चन्द्रादिवाक्यमप्रमाणम्; शिष्टानङ्गीकृतत्वात्, अवैदिकवाक्यवद्' इत्यनुमानमत्र प्रसरीसर्ति इति चेत्; तत्र शिष्टानङ्गीकृतत्वमसिद्धमेव । तथा हि – के नामात्र शिष्टा व्यपदिष्टाः ? किं वैदिका एव ? उत साधुशब्दव्यवहारिणः ? उत ये केचिद् भवदभीष्टा वा ?

३. तत्राद्ये तावत्, परमवैदिकानां वेदव्यासादीनां मुनित्रयालक्षितबहुपदप्रयोगदर्शनात्, 'दृष्ट्वा बहु व्याकरणं मुनिना भारतं कृतम्' इति चोक्तत्वात्; शङ्कराचार्याणामपि प्रपञ्चसारादिषु 'हुनेद्' इत्यादिमुनित्रयानुक्तपदप्रयोगात्; वैदिकोत्तमानां च मुरारिमिश्रसुरेश्वराचार्यादीनां 'विश्रामा'दिशब्दप्रयोगात्; वैदिकवीरस्य

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1 R. सूत्रं   2 R. क्तं

नैषधकारस्य 'नैवाल्पमेधसि पटो रुचिमत्त्वमस्य' इत्यादिप्रयोगात्; वैदिकस्थापकानां विद्यारण्याचार्याणां धातुवृत्तौ 'कथापयति' इत्यादौ शाकटायनादिमताङ्गीकारात्; बोप्पदेवकौमुदीकारादीनां च वैदिकवराणामपाणिनीयानेकशब्दप्रदर्शनदर्शनात्; इदानीमप्युत्तरदेशस्थैर्वैदिकश्रेष्ठैः सारस्वतादिव्याकरणानां प्रमाणीकरणात्; कौमुद्याश्च सर्वदेशपरिगृहीतत्वात्; पाणिनीयोत्पत्तेः प्राग्भवैश्च वैदिकैः व्याकरणान्तराणामेवाङ्गीकृतत्वात्; पाणिनीयव्यतिरिक्तच्छान्दसलक्षणानां प्रातिशाख्यानां युष्माभिरप्यङ्गीकृतत्वाच्च व्याकरणान्तराणां शिष्टाङ्गीकृतत्वं साम्प्रतमेव ॥

४. ननु व्यासाद्युषिवचसां छान्दसत्वेन सिद्धत्वात् तत्सिद्धये कुतो व्याकरणान्तराङ्गीकारः? 'दृष्ट्वा बहु व्याकरणं' इत्यस्य च 'एकमेव व्याकरणं बहुशो दृष्ट्वा' इत्यर्थः इति चेत्, तन्न; मुनित्रयानुक्तच्छान्दसपदसमर्थनार्थं छान्दसलक्षणतयापि व्याकरणान्तराणां तैरादरणीयत्वात्; 'बहु व्याकरणम्' इत्यस्य क्लिष्टार्थकल्पनानुपपत्तेः ॥

५. ननु 'व्यत्ययो बहुलम्', 'बहुलं छन्दसि', 'सर्वे विधयश्छन्दसि विकल्प्यन्ते' इति सूत्रवार्तिकवचनादेव सिद्धेः व्याकरणान्तरं नान्वेष्यमिति चेत्, तर्हि एतैरेव वचनैः कृतार्थौ पाणिनिकात्यायनौ छान्दसविषयशेषग्रन्थिकत्थायां किमर्थं परिक्लिष्टौ? तस्माद् व्यासाद्युक्तावपि विशेषलक्षणव्याकरणान्तरं लभ्यमेव ॥

६. न च प्रातिशाख्यलभ्यमिति वाच्यम्; तेषामपि व्याकरणान्तरत्वेन भवदुक्तविरोधित्वात्। ननु प्रातिशाख्यान्यसाधारणव्याकरणान्येव, साधारणव्याकरणान्तराणामेव च प्रामाण्यमस्माकमनिष्टम् इति चेत्, न। अपाणिनीयत्वसाम्येऽपि असाधारणव्याकरणानामिष्टत्वे साधारणेषु विद्वेषे च निमित्ताभावात्। पाणिनीयस्य नियमपरत्वात् तत्सदृशेष्वन्येषु प्रद्वेष इति तु पश्चान्निराकरिष्यते। यत्तु 'अपशब्दास्त्रयो माघे' इत्यारभ्य 'व्यासस्तन्मयतां गतः' इति, तदपि गुरुलघ्वोः 'ग' 'ल' शब्दोक्तिवत् नामैकदेशेन नामग्रहणाद् अपशब्दा इति अपाणिनीयशब्दा इति व्याचक्षते महान्तः। उक्तं च —

'अष्टादश पुराणानि नव व्याकरणानि च।
निर्मथ्य चतुरो वेदान् मुनिना भारतं कृतम् ॥'

इति।

'यान्युज्जहार भगवान् व्यासो व्याकरणाम्बुधेः।
तानि किं पदरत्नानि भान्ति पाणिनिगोष्पदे ॥'

इति च ॥

७. ननु छान्दसानामच्छान्दसत्वेन प्रयोगादेव व्यासस्य व्याकरणानभियुक्तत्वमिति चेत्, मैवं सर्वज्ञं व्यासं प्रत्यमङ्गलं वोचः। एवं च पाणिनेरपि व्याकरणानभियुक्तत्वं स्यादिति स्वगलच्छेदकमेवेदं भवतो वचनम्। सोऽपि हि 'वृद्धिरादैच्' इति कुत्वाभावं छान्दसमेव प्रयुक्तवानिति 'कुत्वं कस्मान्न भवति' इत्यादिना भाष्यजालेन भाष्यत इत्यास्तां तावत्॥

८. एतेन 'साधुशब्दव्यवहारित्वं शिष्टत्वम्' इति च निरस्तम्। किंच शिष्टव्यवहृतानामेव साधुत्वम्, साधुशब्दव्यवहारिणामेव शिष्टत्वम्, इति परस्पराश्रयोऽपि प्रसज्येत। शिष्टप्रयुक्तानामेव साधुत्वमिति च व्याकरणमीमांसायामविवादमिति॥

९. एवं तृतीयपक्षोऽपि म्रदीयान्। मुनित्रयमतमात्राङ्गीकारिण एव शिष्टा इत्यत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिवचनाभावेन भवत्कपोलमात्रकल्पितत्वात्। मुनित्रयवचनस्यैव प्रामाण्यात् तदङ्गीकारिणामेव शिष्टत्वमिति चेत्, कर्हिचित् प्रामाण्यवशात् तदङ्गीकारिणां शिष्टत्वं शिष्टाङ्गीकृतत्वाच्च प्रामाण्यम् इत्यन्योन्याश्रयलाभ एव धन्यात्मनाम्। अथ ये केचिदेव भवदभीष्टाः शिष्टा इति चेत्, ये केचिदस्मदभीष्टा इति दुर्युक्तियुक्त एवायं वादकलहः स्यात्। तदप्युक्तम् — 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूलवाक्यम्' इति। बहुविदां व्यासशङ्करादीनां निर्मूलपदप्रयोगाभावात् तन्मूलतया व्याकरणान्तराणां तैरङ्गीकृतत्वात्, शिष्टानङ्गीकृतत्वहेतुरसिद्ध एवेति भावः॥

१०. शब्दश्च वैदिको वा मन्वादिकथितो वा न व्याकरणान्तराणामप्रामाण्यबोधको दृश्यते। न च मुनित्रयवचनं तदनुसारि ग्रन्थान्तरं वा पुनरितरप्रामाण्यप्रतिक्षेपकं साक्षादीक्षामहे॥

११. यत्तु कश्चिद् 'विश्रामा'दीनामयुक्तत्वभाषणं तल्लक्षणान्तरदर्शनेन प्रयोक्तव्यमित्येतावत्परम्। अन्यथा सर्वदेव मुनित्रयवचननिबद्धादराणां मुरार्यादीनां तत्प्रयोगानुपपत्तेः॥

१२. किंच मुनित्रयतदनुसारिवचसां प्रमाण्यातिशये सिद्ध एव तैरन्यशास्त्राणां बाधः, अन्यशास्त्राणामेतद्बाध्यत्वेन दौर्बल्यातिशये सिद्ध एव च एतद्वचसां प्रामाण्यातिशयसिद्धिः, इत्यन्योन्याश्रयेणैव हन्यन्ते महान्तः। मुनित्रयवचनादेव मुनित्रयवचनप्राबल्यसिद्धिरिति स्वाश्रयमपि प्रसक्तमेव॥

१३. न च 'पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्याः' इतिवत् मुनित्रयवचनेन 'एत एव साधुशब्दाः' इति नियमितत्वादन्येषामप्रामाण्यमिति वाच्यम्। 'आबादयः प्रयोगत अनुसर्तव्याः' इत्यादि तत्र तत्र वर्णनाद् आकृतिगणादिपरिग्रहाच्च नियमाभावस्य स्पष्टत्वात्। अन्यथा पाणिनिकात्यायनाभ्याम् 'एत एव साधवः' इति नियमनाद् भाष्यकारकृतेष्ट्यादिवचनमप्रमाणं स्यात्। पाणिनिनियमितत्वाद् वा कात्यायनवचनान्यपि बाध्येरन्। ननु पतञ्जलेः सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वात् तद्वचनबाधाभावाय व्याकरणान्तरमपि (प्राप्तम्) बाध्यम्। मुनित्रयवचनस्य नियमपरत्वे छान्दससूत्रैरेत एव साधुशब्दा इति नियमितत्वात् प्रातिशाख्यान्यपि प्रत्याख्येयानि स्युः ॥

१४. ननु मुनित्रयवचने वेदविशेषलक्षणानिरीक्षणात् सामान्यलक्षणपराणि व्याकरणान्तराण्येव तेन व्यावर्त्यन्ते, न वेदविशेषलक्षणपराणि प्रातिशाख्यानि इति चेत्, न। 'संबुद्धौ शाकल्यस्येतावनार्षे', 'यजुष्युरः', 'देवसुम्नयोर्यजुषि काठके', 'सामस्विकः', 'प्लुतपूर्वस्य सवर्णदीर्घबाधनार्थं यणादेशो वक्तव्यः' इत्यादिवेदविशेषलक्षणानामपि स्पष्टदृष्टत्वात्। न च 'दृष्टानुविधिश्छन्दसि भवति' इति वचनात् छान्दसेषु न नियमः प्रवर्तत इति वाच्यम्। शास्त्रसाकल्यस्य नियमपरत्वे तदन्तर्गते छान्दसेऽपि नियमस्य दुर्वारत्वात्। 'शिष्टप्रयोगानुसारि व्याकरणम्' इति तत्र तत्र दर्शनेन लौकिकेष्वपि शिष्टानुविधिसाम्याच्च। तस्मादाकृतिगणादिभिः सावशेषे शास्त्रे 'एतेषामेव शब्दानां प्रयोगे धर्मो भवति' इति नियन्तुमशक्यत्वाद् 'एतत्प्रकाराणां साधुशब्दानां प्रयोगे धर्मः, तदितरापशब्दप्रयोगे त्वधर्मः' इत्येतावदेव नियमपरत्वं वक्तव्यम् ॥

१५. अत एव तद्धितप्रकरणे 'शिष्टप्रयोगतोऽनुगन्तव्यम्' इत्यस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिकारेणोक्ते पदमञ्जरीकृदाह – 'किमर्थं तर्हि व्याकरणमिति चेद् उच्यते। व्याकरणोक्तान् शब्दान् विदित्वा तत्सम्यग्व्यवहारिणः पुरुषान् दृष्ट्वा शिष्टा एत इत्यवगम्य तत्प्रयुक्तमन्यदपि ग्राह्यतया ज्ञातुं शिष्टपरिज्ञानार्थं व्याकरणम्' इति। अतो नियमपरत्वं परास्तम्॥

१६. किं चात्र भाष्यादिगिरा तदुक्तेः
प्राबल्यमित्येवमुदीर्यते चेत्।
ततो मदुक्तत्ववशान्मदुक्तिः
प्रमाणमित्येव वचो लघीयः ॥

१७. तत् सिद्धं अपौरुषेयः पौरुषेयो वा शब्दो न व्याकरणान्तराणामप्रामाण्यं बोधयतीति। तदिदमुक्तम् – 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूलवाक्यम्' इति। बहुविदां

भाष्यकारादीनां निर्मूलं शास्त्रान्तराप्रामाण्यकथनं स्ववचनप्राबल्यवचनं वा स्वाश्रयाभिभवान्न संभवतीति भावः। अत्र क्वचित् परशास्त्रदूषणमस्ति चेदपि युक्तिरसमालेनैव इत्यवगन्तव्यम्। किंच 'असिद्धवदत्राभात्' इत्यादि परशशनानि सूत्राणि भाष्यनिरस्तान्यपि न त्यज्यन्ते। तद् वस्तुपरं शास्त्रमिति ॥

१८. ननु बहुङ्गीकारान्यथानुपपत्त्या मुनित्रयवचसामेव प्रामाण्यम्, अन्यशास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यमपि सिद्धम् इत्यर्थापत्तिरेवात्र प्रमाणमिति चेत्, तदपि न। सुमहत्वपरिमितत्वादिगुणातिशयवशादेव बहुङ्गीकारविशेषणस्योपपत्तेः। तद्वशादन्येषामप्रमाण्यस्य साधयितुमशक्यत्वात्। अन्यथा तर्कग्रन्थेषु मणिरेव बहुङ्गीकृत इति कुसुमाञ्जलिकिरणावलिपक्षिलभाष्यादीनि अप्रमाणानि भवेयुः। शब्दशास्त्रेऽपि कैयटटीका बहुङ्गीकृतेति भर्तृहरिटीकाद्यप्रमाणं स्यात्। स्मृतिष्वपि मानवादीनां पुराणेष्वपि भागवतादीनां शिक्षासु च शौनकीयादीनां बहुङ्गीकृतत्वाद् इतरेषामप्रामाण्यं वदन् भवानवैदिकतमश्चापद्येत। पाणिनीयानां तु गुणातिशयोऽस्माकमिष्ट एव। इतरेषामप्रामाण्यमेव त्वनिष्टम्। एतेन मीमांसादिषु व्याख्यानाय पाणनीयमेव गृहीतमिति तस्यैव प्रामाण्यमित्येतदपि निरस्तम्। गुणवत्त्वात् प्रसिद्धतया मीमांसादौ तदुपादानोपपत्तेः। तेनान्येषामप्रामाण्यकल्पनानवकाशात्। तदिदमुक्तम् — 'बहुङ्गीकारभेदो भवति गुणवशाद्' इति ॥

१९. किंच एवंवादिना पाणिनेः प्राक् कथं शब्दव्यवहारवार्ता इति वक्तव्यम्। न हि तदा साधुशब्दव्यवहार एव नास्तीति युक्तम्। ऊहादिसाधुत्वाभावेन सकलधर्मानुष्ठानविप्लवप्रसङ्गाद्, अपशब्दप्रयोगकृतसर्वनरकपातप्रसंगात्, सर्वेषां म्लेच्छताप्रसंगाच्च। न च तदा व्याकरणं विनैव साधुशब्दान् जानन्तीति वाच्यम्। 'ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणः षडङ्गो वेदोऽध्येयो ज्ञेयश्च' इति श्रुतिवचनात्, तदानीं षडङ्गाध्ययनाभावेन सर्वेषामब्राह्मणत्वप्रसंगात्। न च पञ्चाङ्गान्येव तदानीमध्येयानीति वा पाणिनीयस्यैवाङ्गत्वमिति वा वचनमस्ति। भाष्यकारोऽपि 'तस्मादध्येयं व्याकरणम्' इत्येव मुहुर्मुहुराह, न त्वध्येयं पाणिनीयमिति। तस्मात् पणिनीयोत्पत्तेः पूर्वं पूर्वव्याकरणानामेव बहुङ्गीकारात् तदन्यथानुपपत्तिजं प्रामाण्यं तेषामप्यनिवार्यम् ॥

२०. किंच पूर्वं तावत् पूर्वशास्त्राण्येव बहुङ्गीकृतानि संप्रत्यपि संग्रथ्यन्ते, पाणिनीयं तु इदानीमेव बहुङ्गीकृतम्, पूर्वं न प्रावर्तत, इति बहुङ्गीकारविशेषणप्रामाण्यसाधने तेषामेव वैशिष्ट्यं स्यात् ॥

२१. ननु प्रमाणचराण्यपि पूर्वशास्त्राणि पाणिनीयोत्पत्तेः परस्तात् परास्तप्रामाण्यमसृणान्यप्यभूवन् इति चेत्, मैवम् ।

कथं प्रमाणभूतानां कालात् प्रामाण्यनिह्नवः ।
श्रुतिस्मृत्यादयोऽप्येवमप्रमाणाः स्युरेकदा ॥

अत एव हि 'कृते तु मानवो धर्मः' इति केनचित् साक्षादुक्तमप्यनादृत्य कलियुगेऽपि मनुवचनं प्रमाणीक्रियते। अतो न कालवशात् प्रामाण्यक्षयः गुणभेदादङ्गीकारभेद एव तु भवति इति । तदिदमुक्तम् - 'पाणिनेः प्राक् कथं वा' इति ॥

२२. एवमप्रामाण्यहेत्वभावे सिद्धे 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूलवाक्यम्' इत्यनेनैव शास्त्रान्तराणां प्रामाण्यं साध्यम्। 'चन्द्रादिवाक्यं प्रमाणम्, समूलवाक्यत्वात्, पाणिनीयवत्'; 'समूलं च तद्वाक्यम्, बहुविद्वाक्यत्वात्, तद्वदेव'; 'बहुविदश्च ते, शास्त्रकारित्वात्, पाणिनिवदेव' ॥

२१. न हि बहुविधं वक्तव्यजातं सम्यगजानन् शास्त्रं कर्तुमारभते। आरभमाणोऽपि वा परिहासास्पदं स्यात्। तस्मात् शास्त्रकारत्वेन प्रसिद्धानां तेषामपि शब्दतत्त्वविस्तरवेदित्वात्, भ्रान्तिविप्रलम्भकत्वशङ्कायाश्च पाणिनिवदेव तेषामपि निरवकाशत्वात्, सावकाशत्वे वा पाणिनेरपि तच्छङ्काया दुर्वारत्वाद्, आप्तप्रणीतत्वहेतुना व्याकरणान्तराण्यपि प्रमाणानीति सिद्धम् ॥

२२. ननु पाणिनीयगतज्ञापकादिनैव शिष्टप्रयोगाणां साधयितुं शक्यत्वाद् व्याकरणान्तराणां वैफल्यादेवाप्रमाणत्वं ब्रूम इति चेत्, तदपि न। क्वचित् प्रयोगाल्लक्षणकल्पना, क्वचिल्लक्षणात् प्रयोगकल्पनमिति पाणिनीयपातित्रत्यजुषामप्यविवादम्। तत्र शिष्टप्रयोगे दृष्टे ज्ञापकादिनैव साध्यत्वं नाम। यत्र तु 'कथापयति' इत्यादौ व्याकरणान्तरलक्षणमेव दृष्टं, तत्र कथमस्य गतार्थत्वकृतमप्रामाण्यमापाद्यते ? अपिच, शिष्टप्रयोगदृष्टिस्थलेऽपि 'विश्रामा'दौ व्याकरणान्तरसाक्षाल्लक्षणस्य स्पष्टदृष्टत्वात् क्लिष्टतरज्ञापकादिवर्णनं गौरवायेति प्राप्तेऽपि प्रौढिकामैर्मुनित्रयपूजनार्थं तदीयज्ञापकादिनैव साध्यते चेदस्माकमप्यभीष्टतरमेव। न तु तेन व्याकरणान्तराणां गतार्थत्वमप्रामाण्यं वा इत्यास्तामेतत् ॥

२५. किंच पूर्वाचार्याणां प्रामाण्यं पाणिन्यादीनामप्यनुमतमेव। 'आङि चापः', 'औङ आपः' इत्यदौ पूर्वाचार्यमतसाक्षात्संज्ञया एवोपात्तत्वात्। 'व्योर्लघुप्रयत्नतरः

शाकटायनस्य', 'वा सुप्यापिशलेः', 'वष्टि भागुरिरल्लोपमवाप्योरुपसर्गयोः' इत्यादौ पूर्वाचार्यमतस्य साक्षादुपादानाच्च। न हि पूर्वाचार्यसंकीर्तनमात्राद् विकल्प उत्तिष्ठति। तन्मतमेवं मम मतमेवमिति तन्मतोपादानादेव विकल्पसिद्धिः। किं च 'तदशिष्यं संज्ञाप्रमाणत्वात्', 'लुब्योगाप्रख्यानात्' इति पूर्वाचार्योक्तं पाणिनिः स्वयमेव दूषयित्वा पुनः 'जनपदे लुप्' इत्यादीनि दूषितचराण्येव पूर्वाचार्यवचनानि स्पष्टमुपादत्ते। तेन ज्ञायते क्वचिद् युक्तिरसाद् दूषणे कथितेऽपि पूर्वाचार्यवचनमुपादेयमेवेति ॥

२६. एवं पाणिनिना स्वेन दूषितस्यापि संग्रहात्।
पूर्वाचार्यमतं क्वापि व्याख्यादौ दूष्यते यदि ॥
युक्तिप्रौढिरसेनैवेत्यवगच्छन्तु कोविदाः।
तावता हेयता नेति ज्ञापयामास पाणिनिः ॥

तेन पाणिन्युक्तं प्रमाणमित्यङ्गीकुर्वतापि तदभिमतत्वादेव पूर्वशास्त्राण्यपि प्रमाणमित्यङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। तदिदमुक्तम् - 'पूर्वोक्तं पाणिनिश्चाप्यनुवदति' इति ॥

२७. किंच 'अनादिश्चैषा व्याकरणपरंपरा' इत्युक्तत्वात् पूर्वव्याकरणमूलमालोच्य पाणिनिनापि शास्त्रं कृतमिति वक्तव्यम्। 'तेन प्रोक्तम्' इत्यत्रैव च 'पाणिनीयं शास्त्रम्' इत्युदाह्रियते, न 'कृते ग्रन्थे' इत्यत्र। तस्मात् पाणिनिनापि शास्त्रस्य प्रत्याहारविशेषशालित्वेनोक्तत्वमेव; न कृतत्वम्, इत्यवगम्यते। ततश्चापाणिनीयत्वात् पूर्वशास्त्राणामप्रामाण्यं वदता पाणिनीयस्यापि निर्मूलत्वादप्रामाण्यमेवापादितमिति सकलव्याकरणभञ्जनं संजनितं महाशाब्दिकैः ॥

२८. ननु पाणिनिः पूर्वशास्त्राणि प्रयोगान्तराणि च दृष्ट्वा तेषु हेयभागमपहाय शास्त्रं कृतवानिति पाणिन्यनुक्तं हेयमेवेति चेत्, न। पाणिन्यनुक्तस्य हेयत्वे वार्तिककीर्तितस्यापि हेयत्वप्रसंगात्। न च सूत्रवार्तिककारयोरसर्ववित्त्वेऽपि भाष्यकारस्तु भगवान् शेष एवेति तस्मिन्नज्ञातृत्वशङ्काभावात् तदनुक्तं हेयमेवेति वाच्यम्। ज्ञातृत्वेऽप्यानन्त्यवशादनुक्तिसंभवात्। अन्यथा आकृतिगणादीनि कुतस्तेन परिच्छिन्नानि ? इत्यास्तां तावत् ॥

२९. तेनैवमेव वक्तव्यम् -

दृष्ट्वा शास्त्रगणान् प्रयोगसहितान् प्रायेण दाक्षीसुतः
प्रोचे, तस्य तु विच्युतानि कतिचित् कात्यायनः प्रोक्तवान्।

तद्भ्रष्टान्यवदत् पतञ्जलिमुनिस्तेनाप्यनुक्तं क्वचि-
ल्लोकात् प्राक्तनशास्त्रतोऽपि जगदुर्विज्ञाय भोजादयः ॥

अतः सिद्धं पाणिनीयमूलभूतत्वात् पूर्वशास्त्राणां प्रामाण्यमनिवार्यमिति। तदप्युक्तम् – 'पूर्वोक्तं पाणिनिश्चाप्यनुवदति' इति ॥

३०. नन्वस्तु तावदेवमविरोधस्थले; पाणिन्यादिवचनविरोधे तु शास्त्रान्तरोक्तं बाध्यमेव; इति चेत्, न। तेषामपि प्रमाणत्वेनाबाध्यत्वस्य स्थितत्वात्। उदितानुदितहोमवत्, षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणवच्च विकल्पस्यैव प्रकल्प्यत्वात्। अत एव स्मृतिचन्द्रिकादिषु स्मृतिकारवचनयोर्विरोधे सति द्वयोरपि विकल्पेन ग्राह्यत्वं तत्र तत्रोच्यते।

तत्र तत्र विकल्पार्थं पूर्वाचार्याननुदीरयन्।
मतभेदे द्वयं ग्राह्यं ज्ञापयत्येव पाणिनिः ॥

३१. न चैकस्यैव शब्दस्य शास्त्रद्वयेन साधुत्वमसाधुत्वं च बोध्यत इति वस्तुतो द्वैरूप्यायोगेन विरोधस्यैव युक्तत्वात् न ग्रहणाग्रहणानुष्ठानवद् विकल्पसंभव इति वाच्यम्। नहि केनापि शास्त्रेण शास्त्रान्तरोक्तस्यासाधुत्वं बोध्यते। किंतु लक्षणशिष्टप्रयोगरहिताः शब्दा असाधव इति दिक्प्रदर्शनन्यायेन बोधितं भवतीति नियमपरत्वदूषणावसर एव भाषितम्। किं च षोडशिग्रहणमपि शास्त्राभ्यामदृष्टहेतुत्वेन प्रत्यवायहेतुत्वेन च बोधितमिति कथं तत्र श्रुतिशरणानां विकल्पेनापि प्रवृत्तिसिद्धिरिति पृष्टे यः परिहारः स एवात्रापि भविष्यतीति सिद्धं विरोधप्रतिभानेऽपि विकल्पेन ग्रहणमिति। तदिदमुक्तम् – 'विरोधेऽपि कल्प्यो विकल्पः' इति ॥

३२. किंच विरोध एव पाणिनीयेतरवचसोर्न संभवति। तत्र विधिसूत्रेषु तावद् 'एतेभ्य एवायं प्रत्ययो भवति' इत्यादिनियमो न संभवति; अप्राप्ते नियमायोगात्। न च 'सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणम्' इति न्यायेन नियमः शङ्कनीयः। अयोगव्यवच्छेदेनाप्यवधारणसंभवात्। अन्यथा अप्राप्तविधिनियमविधिद्वयकथाप्युच्छिद्येत। तस्मादप्राप्तविधिषु तावत् परशास्त्रैरधिकोक्तौ न विरोधः। यत्र तूत्सर्गतः प्राप्तावपवादतया नियमार्थं सूत्रं तत्रापि परैरधिकोक्तौ 'क्वचिदपवादविषयेऽप्युत्सर्गो भवति' इति न्यायादविरोधः ॥

३३. न च पाणिनिना 'न' इत्युक्ते परैः 'अस्ति' इत्युच्यमाने विरोधः; 'ज्ञापकगणनञ्निर्दिष्टान्यनित्यानि' इति नञ्निर्दिष्टस्यानित्यत्वकथनेन परविरोद्धृत्वाभावात्। न च भाष्याद्युक्तयुक्तिभिर्विरोध इति वाच्यम्;

युक्तयो न्यायवाक्योत्था न्यायाश्च ज्ञापकोद्भवाः ।
ज्ञापकोक्तास्त्वनित्याश्च न चानित्या विरोधिनः ॥

युक्त्यैव शब्दसिद्धिश्चेद् विप्लुता शब्दसाधुता ।
तस्माद् दृढप्रयोगान् वा पूर्वव्याकरणानि वा ॥

आलम्ब्यैव हि युक्त्यापि साधयन्ति मनीषिणः ।
अत एव हि युक्त्युक्त्या साधने वक्तृचिन्तनम् ॥

तस्माच्छब्दाभियुक्तानां युक्त्या द्वेधापि साधने ।
समूलत्वाद् द्वयं ग्राह्यमविरोधश्च वर्णितः ॥

३४. न च क्वचिद् ज्ञापकं विनाऽपि 'विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्' इति साक्षाद् वचनमेव युक्तिः स्यादिति तत्रानित्यत्वाभावाद् विरोध इति वाच्यम्। साक्षाद् वचनेऽपि विधि-निषेधकोटयोरविरोधस्य प्रागुक्तत्वात्। तत् सिद्धमविरुद्धत्वात् सर्वव्याकरणानां सम-प्रामाण्यम्। तदिदमुक्तं विरोधस्यासंभवद्योतकेन 'विरोधेऽपि' इत्यपिशब्देन ॥

३५. नन्वस्तु तावदेवं पूर्वव्याकरणानामार्षत्वेन प्रामाण्यम्; अर्वाचीनभोजबोप्प-देवादिवचनानां तु कथं कथ्यत इति चेत्, तत्रापि 'न खलु बहुविदामस्ति निर्मूल-वाक्यम्' इति ब्रूमः। भाष्यादिकथितसकललक्षणानुकथनादिपरिनिश्चितबहुविद्भावा हि भोजादयः शास्त्रान्तरमहाजनप्रयोगादिमूलमालम्ब्यैव शास्त्राणि प्रणीतवन्त इति पाणिनीयवत् तेषामपि प्रामाण्यमेव। त्रिमुनिव्याकरणे उत्तरोत्तरं च प्रमाणमित्यत्रापि बहुवित्त्वमेव उत्तरोत्तरप्रामाण्ये हेतुः। दृष्टहेतुसंभवेऽदृष्टहेतुकल्पनानुपपत्तेः। तच्च बहुवित्त्वं भोजादीनामपि समानमिति तेषां विशेषादरणीयत्वमेवेति ॥

३६. 'न खलु बहुविदाम्' इत्यस्यान्योऽप्यर्थः। निर्मूलं खलु व्याकरणान्तराप्रामाण्यं बहुविदो न वदेयुः। एतदपेक्षया तावद् बहुविदां विद्यारण्यादीनां तदकथनात्।

तस्माद् बहुग्रन्थवेदित्वाभावादेवायं प्रतिवादी निर्लज्जमेव निर्मूलवाक्यं प्रलपतीत्युपहसनीयमेवेति ।

पूर्वव्याकरणादि मूलरहितं युक्त्यैव यत् साध्यते
कैश्चित्तत्र मुनित्रयाप्रतिहते हेयत्वमुद्घोष्यते ।
अन्येभ्यो गुणवत्तया च बहुभिर्यद् गृह्यते खल्विदं
तस्मात् खल्वयमन्यशास्त्रमखिलं मिथ्येति विभ्राम्यति ॥

इति ॥

३७. एवमस्माभिर्व्याकरणान्तरप्रामाण्ये साधिते सति यत् पुनः परेणाप्रामाण्यसाधनं कृतं तदर्थाद् गर्भस्रावेण गतमपीदानीं प्रत्येकयुक्त्युपादानेन खण्ड्यते ॥

३८. तत्र यत् तावदुक्तं 'शंकराचार्यप्रभृतिभिः श्रुतिव्याख्यादिषु पाणिनीयमेव गृहीतमिति तस्यैव प्रामाण्यम्, अन्यव्याकरणानां व्याख्यानागृहीतत्वादप्रामाण्यम्' इति, तदसारम् । शंकराचार्यमुरारिप्रभृतिभिरपि स्वप्रयोगमूलत्वेन व्याकरणान्तराणामङ्गीकरणात् । व्याख्यादिषु ग्रहणाग्रहणयोः बहुप्रसिद्ध्यल्पप्रसिद्धिनिबन्धनत्वेन प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकत्वाभावात् । विद्यारण्यादिभिश्च 'अल्पमेधः'पदादिव्याख्याने, क्षीरस्वामि - सर्वानन्दसुबोधिनीकारादिभिश्च अमरसिंहनिघण्टुव्याख्याने तत्र तत्राङ्गीकृतत्वाद् वेदनिघण्टुव्याख्यात्रा च भोजसूत्रस्य सर्वत्राङ्गीकृतत्वाद्, व्याख्यानादिष्वपरिगृहीतत्वस्याप्यसिद्धेः । पाणिनीयप्राक्काले च तेषामेव प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकार्यम् । न च सिद्धस्य प्रमाण्यस्य नाशे कारणमस्ति इत्याद्युक्तमेव ॥

३९. यत्तु मुनित्रयवचनस्य 'एत एव साधुशब्दाः' इति नियमपरत्वाद् एतद्विरोधादन्यशास्त्राणां त्याज्यत्वमुक्तम्, तदपि नियमस्य शास्त्रस्वभावत्वे पाणिनिनियमितत्वाद् वार्तिकाप्रामाण्यं स्यादिति बहुधा परोक्तनियमपरत्वनिरसनादपास्तमेव । विरोधे चैकमेव ग्राह्यमित्येतच्च षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणादौ स्मृतिचन्द्रिकाद्युक्तस्मृतिद्वयोक्तविकल्पनीयत्वे च व्यभिचरितमित्युक्तप्रायम् । विरोधश्च नियमाभावान्नास्तीत्युक्तम् ॥

४०. यत्तु व्यासोक्तानां प्रातिशाख्यरूपासाधारणव्याकरणमूलत्वमिति, तदपि न । अपाणिनीयत्वसाम्येऽप्यसाधारणव्याकरणानामिष्टत्वे साधारणेषु विद्वेषे च निमित्तं

नास्तीत्युक्तत्वात् । छान्दससूत्रैः एत एव वेदे साधव इति नियमितत्वेन परमते प्रातिशाख्यप्रामाण्यस्यापि दुःसाधत्वाच्च ॥

४१. यत्तु आचार्यसंकीर्तनस्य विकल्पाद्यर्थत्वेनोपपत्तेः न तत्प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकृतमिति, तदपि न। 'तन्मतमेवं तन्मतमेवम्' इति तन्मतस्य प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकरणे विकल्पस्यैवासिद्धेः स्ववाग्विरुद्धत्वात् । न च संकीर्तनमात्राद् विकल्प उत्तिष्ठति । प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकारे पूजार्थत्वं तु दूरापास्तम् ॥

४२. यत्तु मीमांसादावनभिमताचार्यसंकीर्तनवदिदमुपपन्नमिति, तन्न। तत्र दूष्यत्वेनैव तन्मतोपादानात् । इह तु तदभावात् । न च 'तत् प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वाद्' इत्यादौ ग्राह्यतासंकीर्तनेऽपि देवताविग्रहवत्त्वादौ तन्मतस्य परित्यागदर्शनादत्रापि तथा इति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि मतभेदेन सर्ववैदिकपक्षाणां गृह्यमाणत्वदर्शनात् ॥

४३. यत्तु कौमुदीकारादिभिः स्वबुद्धिविस्तारबोधनार्थमेव मतान्तरप्रदर्शनं कृतं, न तत्प्रामाण्यादिति, तदप्यबद्धम् । अप्रमाणभूतस्य कथने स्वबुद्धिमान्द्यस्यैव प्रकाशनप्रसंगादिति । एवं परोक्तावस्मदुक्तविरुद्धोंऽशः खण्डितः ।

ततोऽन्यग्रन्थसंदोहैर्मदुक्तान्येव साधयन् ।
वैननेयो ममात्यन्तं बन्धुरेवेति शोभनम् ॥

— . . —

हे ! श्रीमच्चोळदेशप्रथितबुधवराः शब्दशास्त्रान्तराणां
कोऽप्यप्रामाण्यमूचे किमपि निगदितं तत्र चास्माभिरेवम् ।
कौमुद्यां धातुवृत्त्यादिषु कथिततया वैदिकाङ्गत्वसाम्याद्
युष्माकं संमतं स्यादिति लिखितमिदं शोधयध्वं महान्तः ॥

श्रीसोमेश्वरदीक्षिताभिधमहाविद्वत्कुलाग्रेसरा
मीमांसाद्वयशब्दतर्ककुशला युष्मानधृष्योन्नतीन् ।
तत्त्वज्ञान् करुणानिधीन् प्रशमिनः श्रुत्वेदमभ्यर्थये
यत् किंचिल्लिखितं मयाऽत्र तदिदं स्वीकार्यमार्यात्मभिः ॥

युष्माभिः खलु कामदेवविजये व्यालेखि कक्ष्याक्रम-
स्तं द्रष्टुं भृशमुत्सुका वयमतः संप्रेष्यतां सांप्रतम् ।
युष्मादृक्षविचक्षणोक्तिपदवीसंप्रेक्षणेन क्षणा-
दस्माकं खलु बुद्धिशुद्धिरुदियादित्येष[1] तत्राशयः ॥

प्रयुक्तहेतौ सति कामदेवे कुतोऽस्य भङ्गः पटुदर्शनेन ।
सोमेश्वराख्याग्रहणस्य[2] चैतत् सर्वज्ञभावस्य च युक्तरूपम् ॥

युष्मद्दैदुष्यधूतं[3] खलु कटकभुवि त्रायते भोगिराजं[4]
वाणीवेणीविधूतामपि सुरसरितं[5] कङ्कटीको जटायाम्[6] ।
इत्येवं यज्ञनारायणविबुधमहादीक्षिताः शत्रुवर्ग-
त्राणाद् देवस्य तस्याप्यपहरथ धिया साधु सार्वज्ञ्यगर्वम्[7] ॥

युष्मास्वेव क्षितीशो विपुलनयनिधिस्तिष्ठते राज्यदृष्टौ
तिष्ठध्वे यूयमेव प्रथितबुधजने सन्दिहाने समेते
युष्मभ्यं तिष्ठते कस्त्रिदशगुरुसमानोऽपि युष्मादृगन्यः
[8]प्रज्ञालुर्यज्ञनारायणविबुधमहादीक्षिता[9] वीक्ष्यते[10] कः ? ॥

अस्वस्थाः केरलस्थाः स्वयमतिमृदवस्तत्र चाहं विशेषात्
सर्वे दूरप्रचारे खलु शिथिलधियः किं पुनर्देशभेदे
एवंभावेऽपि दैवात् कुहचन समये कल्यताकल्यते चेत्
प्रज्ञाब्धीन् यज्ञनारायणविबुधमहादीक्षितानीक्षिताहे ॥

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1. Tc. ०रुदयेदि०　2. Tc. ०ग्रगणस्य　3. Tc. ०धूतः
4. Tc. ०राजो　5. Tc. ०सरितः　6. Tc. जटायाः
7. Tc. सर्वज्ञगर्वम्　8. R प्रज्ञालून्; Tc. प्रज्ञालो
9. R. ०दीक्षितान्　10. R. वीक्षते.

PROVING THE AUTHORITY OF NON-PANINIAN GRAMMARS

> I, the same Nārāyaṇa[1], now depending upon Sudarśana[2], O! Vainateya[3]! propose to maintain myself having overpowered your pakṣa[4].

This is the summary [of this treatise] :

> Some say that what is said by Pāṇini is authoritative, not the treatises of Candra, Bhoja, and others; this is most flimsy, for those who know much do not speak without base; that more people prefer a thing is due to its merits; how was it before Pāṇini? Pāṇini himself quotes what was said by [his] predecessors; even if there be a conflict an option is to be presumed.

1. i.e., The author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva* (PS) in which the authority of the non-Paninian grammars is admitted.
2. The word means 'correct view' as well as the divine disc of that name associated with Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu.
3. This name is yet to be identified. There were several Vaiṇateyas (probably belonging to *Tārkṣya* family) See: Dr. V. Raghavan, Introduction to the *Śahendravilāsa*, Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Series No. 54, p. 44.
4. *Pakṣa* means 'view' or 'opinion' and also the wing. The whole verse is an allusion to the mythical story of *garuḍagarvabhaṅga* narrated in the *Udyogaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, Canto 10[illegible], where Viṣṇu overpowers the celestial bird Garuḍa and brings him to his knees The verses 18 and 32 are most pertinent :

 स तस्य वचनं श्रुत्वा खगस्योदर्कदारुणम् ।
 संक्षोभ्यं क्षोभयंस्तार्क्ष्यमुवाच रथचक्रभृत् ॥
 एवं विष्णुवलाक्रान्तो गर्वनाशमुपागतः ।
 गरुडो वलवान् राजन् वैनतेयो महायशाः ॥

1. Here there are some who, professing themselves to be scholars, think that the grammars composed by the ancient teachers like Indra[5], Candra[6], Kāśakṛtsni[7], Āpiśali[8] and Śākaṭāyana[9] are not authoritative; what is said by the trinity of sages alone is authoritative. This is indeed rediculous; for the words of Candra and others are to be deemed as authoritative since they are not spoken by untrustworthy persons. Lack of authority of human words is due to nothing else but their being uttered by an untrustworthy person; so those who speak of the lack of authority for the [grammatical] rules of Candra and others will have to show the proof for their untrustworthiness.

2. Their untrustworthiness is not known by direct perception. Nor can it be known by the inference 'the words of Candra etc., are not authoritative, because they are not accepted by the righteous, like the non-vedic words', because [the probans] 'non-acceptance by the righteous' is not proved. Who are those that are meant here by [the expression] 'the righteous'? Those who are the votaries of the *Vedas*? Or those who use correct words? Or only those whom you accept to be the righteous?

3. In the first instance it is very clear that the righteous have accepted other grammars. For,

a) Vedavyāsa, etc., who were the supermost among the votaries of the *Veda* have used many words which are not noticed by the trinity of sages, and it is recorded that 'after seeing many a grammar the *Bhārata* was composed by the sage';

b) Sankarācārya has also used the words '*hunet*', etc., in his *Prapañcasāra* which are not sanctioned by the trinity of sages[10]

5 There is much controversy regarding this grammarian Some place him before Pāṇini, while others either bring him down to the Post-Paninian period or identify him with the author of the *Kātantra*. See *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar* (SSG) by S K. Belvalkar, pp. 10 ff.

6 Candragomin who flourished, probably, in the fifth century A.D His work was made use of by the authors of the *Kāśikā* (K).

7. According to the *Mahābhāṣya* (MB) the author is Kāśakṛtsni and his work *Kāśakṛtsnam*. *Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar* (DSG) gives the form Kāśakṛtsna alone as the name of the author. The *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* has only *Kāśakṛtsni* The *prātipadika kāśakṛtsna* is included in the *upakādi* (Pā II. 4. 69) and *arīhaṇādi* (Pā. IV 2 80) *gaṇas*. The *Brahmasūtras* refer to Kāśakṛtsna, an author.

8 A grammarian referred to by Pāṇini in VI 1. 92, etc.

9 This is not the ancient teacher known to Pāṇini, but the Jaina grammarian who wrote the *Śākaṭāyana-śabdānuśāsana* and a commentary on it. SSG. p. 68 ff.

10. The form should be *juhuyāt* according to Pāṇini. *Prapañcasāra* (Arthur Avalon, Calcutta 1935), VI. 93, 94, 97. In VI. 91, however, the form *juhuyāt* is used.

c) M u r ā r i m i ś r a[11], S u r e ś v a r ā c ā r y a[12], etc., who were the best among the votaries of the *Veda*, have used the words, *viśrāma*, etc.;

d) the author of the *Naiṣadha*, the hero of the followers of the *Veda*, has used '*naivālpamedhasi paṭo rucimattvam asya*'[13];

e) V i d y ā r a ṇ y ā c ā r y a who was the re-establisher of the vedic religion has accepted the view of Ś ā k a ṭ ā y a n a , etc., in respect of the words *kathāpayati*, etc.[14], in the *Dhātuvṛtti*;

f) B o p p a d e v a[15], the author of the *Kaumudī* and many others who are noted among the votaries of the *Veda* have used several words which are not accepted by P ā ṇ i n i ;

g) even now the revered followers of the *Veda* in the Northern regions regard the *Sārasvata* Grammar,[16] etc., as authoritative;

h) the *Kaumudī*[17] is accepted (for study) in all regions;

i) the votaries of the *Veda* prior to P ā ṇ i n i 's birth should have necessarily accepted only other grammars;

and

j) you yourself have accepted the *Prātiśākhyas* whose rules on Vedic usages are quite different from those given by P ā ṇ i n i .

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11 *Anargharāghava* 1, 10. (Also see *Meghadūtam*, I. 27, where Mallinātha remarks: विश्रामो वा इति चान्द्रव्याकरणविकल्पेन वृद्धिविधानाद् रूपसिद्धिः।)

12. Apparently the author means Bhavabhūti, whose identity with Sureśvarācārya has the blessings of a tradition. See Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya's article in *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol VII, pp 301–8 In PS under Pā. VII. 3. 62, the author mentions the form as used by Murari and Bhavabhūti

विश्रामस्यापशब्दत्वं वृत्त्युक्तं नाद्रियामहे ।
मुरारिभवभूत्या[illegible]प्रमाणीकरोति कः ॥

Sureśvara's works, *Vaiṣkarmya-siddhi* and the *Vārttikas* do not have *viśrāma*. But, if we depend upon the word *ādi* in *viśrāmādi* we can show non-Paninian usages of Sureśvara. For Example, the word *avasitum* found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārttikam*. II. 1. 465, IV 3 728, etc., is non-Paninian. It must be *avasātum* as the root *ṣo* is *aniṭ*

13. *Naiṣadhīyacarita*, XIII 13 The form must be *alpamedhe* as according to Pā. V 4. 122 the *asic* suffix is added to *medhā* only when the latter is preceded by *nañ*, *su* or *dus* The form has, however been justified by resorting to an implication provided by the word *...tyam* in the *sūtra* See K

14 According to Pāṇini the form is *kathayati* PS admits *kathāpayati* as advocated by Sākaṭāyana But in Sākaṭāyana under IV. 2. 100 we find *kathayati*. Roth and Monier Williams record *kathāpayati*.

15. The MSS. of PS have *Boppadeva* although SSG and DSG have *Bopadeva* alone. The doubling may be to fecilitate Dravidian pronounciation.

16 Ascribed to Anubhūtisvarūpācārya, though the real author seems to be Narendrācārya. SSG p. 17.

17. The *Prakriyā-Kaumudī* of Rāmacandra

4. [Objection:] The usages of the sages like V y ā s a are valid as ... usages, so where is the need for other grammars to establish their ... ity. The phrase 'after seeing many grammars' can be taken to mean 'after seeing the same grammar for many times'[18].

[Answer:] In order to justify the Vedic usages which are not mentioned by the trinity of sages, they (V y ā s a , etc.) should have resorted to other grammars at least for the rules of Vedic words. It is also not proper to ... such a stretched meaning for the expression '*dṛṣṭvā bahu vyākaraṇam*'.

5. [Objection:] Now in the *Sūtrās* and *Vārttikas* we find such statements as, 'Deviation of these rules is found in many cases (in the Vedic language)'[19], 'In the Vedic language the rules vary (in many ways)'[20]. 'All rules are to be understood as optional with regard to the Vedic language'[21], so there is no necessity of the search for another grammar

[Answer:] This is not correct: because if this be the case, why should P ā ṇ i n i and K ā t y ā y a n a instead of being satisfied with these statements exert themselves to expatiate the remaining portion related to the language? Therefore even for the usages of V y ā s a , etc., other grammars of special rules can be found

6. It cannot be said that those usages can be obtained from the *Prātiśākhyas*: for they are also *other* grammars and so it is against your own words.

[Objection:] The *Prātiśākhyas* are special grammars, what we do not favour is the authority of other general grammars.

[Answer:] There is no reason why one should like the special grammars but dislike the general grammars when both are equal in being other than the grammar of P ā ṇ i n i. The point that because of the restrictive nature of the rules of P ā ṇ i n i there is dislike for other grammars similar to that of P ā ṇ i n i will be refuted elsewhere [in this treatise].[22] [The verse] that begins with 'there are three ungrammatical words in the *Māgha*' [and ends in] 'V y ā s a h a s become one with them' (i.e., the ungrammatical words)[23] is interpreted by eminent [scholars] taking the word *apaśabda* as standing for *apāṇinīyaśabda* by [the method of]

18 i.e., Taking *bahu* as an adverb.

19 Pā III. 1. 85.

20 Ibid. V 2 122, VI 1 34, VII. 1. 8, VII. 1. 103, VII. 3. 97 and VII. 4. 78.

21. MB on Pā. I 4. 9. योगविभागः कर्तव्यः । वा छान्दसि सर्वे विधयो भवन्ति ।

22. See: Paragraphs 13 and 14.

23. The source is to be traced.

uttering a part of the name instead of the whole name,[24] just like [the words] '*ga*' and '*la*' (standing) for *guru* and *laghu* [respectively, in the works of prosody]. It is also stated:

> After churning the eighteen *Purāṇas*, nine grammars and the four *Vedas*, the *Bhārata* was composed by the sage.[25]

Further,

> Could those gems of words, which the venerable Vyāsa took out of the ocean of grammar, be measured in the small puddle of Pāṇini?[26]

7. (If you say) Vyāsa is [to be regarded] not versed in grammar for the same reason of using Vedic words as non-Vedic words, (my reply is) please do not utter such an ominous word against the omniscient Vyāsa. This statement amounts to cutting your own throat, since (according to this) Pāṇini will also have to be deemed as not versed in grammar; for he has used *Vṛdhir ādaic* where the absence of *kutva*[27] is Vedic as has been pointed out by the eleborate *Bhāṣya* beginning with 'why there is no *kutvam* here'[28]. So let this [argument] be closed.

8. By this [the contention that] the righteous are those who use correct words is also set aside. Moreover the [defect of] interdependence [in this argument] is also to the point. The words which are used by the righteous are alone correct and only those who use correct words are the righteous That the words used by the righteous alone are correct is undisputed in the science of grammar.[29]

9. In this way the third view is also frail. 'Only those who have accepted the views of the trinity of sages are the righteous' is not said by any *śruti* or *smṛti*, it is only your presumption [If it is contended that] since the words of the trinity of sages alone are authoritative, only those who acccept them are the righteous, your Blessed Self will have nothing but the benefit of incurring the [defect of] interde-

24. MB on Pā I 1 45 (*Vārttika* 3) पदेषु पदैकदेशान् । देवदत्तो दत्तः सत्यभामा भामेति ।
25. The source is to be traced.
26. Devabodha commentator on the *Mahābhārata* has another version :

    यान्युज्जहार माहेन्द्राद् व्यासो व्याकरणार्णवात् ।
    शब्दरत्नानि किं तानि सन्ति पाणिनिगोष्पदे ॥

27. According to Pā. VIII. 2. 30 *c* at the end of a word is to be replaced by *k*.
28. On Pā. I. 1. 1.
29. MB on Pā. I. 3 1. (Vā. 13).

* स चावश्यं शिष्टप्रयोग उपास्यः ।

pendence [in the argument], namely, because the words are authoritative those who accept them become the righteous, and the words are authoritative because they are accepted by the righteous. If [it is the idea that] the righteous are only those whom you have favoured to be so, then, they could as well be only those who are favoured by us [to be so], and this debate will only prove to be an irrational strife. This is what is meant by 'those who know much do not speak without base'. This means that as Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and others, who know many things would not use words without a base, they should have accepted other grammars as the source of their usages; thus the probans 'being accepted by the righteous' is proved.

10. No verbal testimony of the *Vedas* or Manu and the like is available showing the lack of authority of other grammars. Nor do we find any direct statement by the trinity of sages or any other work of their followers to repudiate the authority of other grammars.

11. The statement (found in some places) that the usages like *viśrāma* are not proper[30], really means that such words are to be used according to the rules found in other grammars. Otherwise, Murāri and others, who have always held the words of the trinity of sages in high reverence could not have made such usages.

12. More over, Your Honour is beaten by the inter-dependence [of your own arguments], for, only when the extra authority of the words of the trinity of sages and its followers is established they can rule out the treatises of others, and only when the extra weakness of the other treatises is established as a result of their being ruled out, the extra authority of the words of the former can be proved. Besides, this would amount to say that the extra strength of the words of the trinity of sages is proved only on the strength of the words of the trinity of sages; thus [the defect of] self-dependance is also to the point.

13. It cannot be said that just as in the case of the statement 'five clawed are to be eaten'[31] the words of the trinity of sages are restrictive that 'only these words are correct', and so others are not authoritative, for, the absence of such a restriction is evident from the statements made very often that 'the [suffixes] *āp*, etc., are to be followed according to the usage'[32], as well as from the acceptance of *ākṛtigaṇas*. Otherwise, as

30. K VII 3. 34 सूर्यविश्रामा भूमिरित्येवमादिकं प्रयोगमन्याय्यमेव मन्यन्ते ; also see f.n 12. *supra*.

31 *Manusmṛti*, V. 17, 18

32 MB on Pā. IV. 1 3, *Padamañjarī* on Pā. IV. 1. 1.
विचित्रा हि शब्दानां शक्तयो यथादर्शनमुपगन्तव्याः ।

Pāṇini and Kātyāyana have already restricted that 'these words alone are correct', the emendations of the author of the *Bhāṣya* would have no authority. The statements of Kātyāyana would also be ruled out by Pāṇini's restrictive rules. Because Patañjali is the most revered [among the three] in order to avoid the nullification of his words other grammars have also to be ruled out.[33] If the words of the three sages are taken as restrictive, since their rules dealing with the Vedic language have determined the correct usages, the *Prātiśākhyas* will also have to be repudiated.

14. [Objection:] Since no special rules regarding the Vedic language are noticed in the works of the three sages, only the grammars dealing with the general rules are ruled out by them, not the *Prātiśākhyas* which deal with the special rules regarding the Vedic language.
[Answer:] This argument cannot hold. For even the special rules regarding the Vedic language are clearly seen in the rules (of the three sages) such as '[The sound] *o* belonging to the vocative singular (is *pragṛhya*) when followed by a non-vedic *iti*'[34], 'In the *Yajus* the word *uras* ending in *o* will not get euphonic change when followed by *a*'.[35] 'The (words) *deva* and *sumna* [will get *ā* for their last phoneme] in the *Kāṭhaka-yajus*'[36], *sāmasvikaḥ*,[37] '[A vowel] preceded by a *pluta* will be replaced by *yaṇ* in order to prevent its elongation',[38] etc. It is not to be said that the restriction does not operate with regard to the Vedic usages because of the statement 'for the Vedic (language) the rules are to be presumed in accordance with the usages found'[39], for when the grammar in its entirety is recognized to be restrictive, it is hardly possible to exclude the restrictive nature of the vedic portion which is also included in it. The rules regarding the classical language also equally follow the correct usage of the righteous, for again and again one finds the statement that the grammar closely follows the usage of the righteous.[40] Therefore in a grammar which is evidently not exhaustive due to the [concept of] *ākṛtigaṇa*, etc., it is impossible to have a restriction that 'the usage of these words alone bring in the unseen merit'. The restric-

33. The reading *prāptam* found in the MS does not make the sense coherent, hence the suggestion to read *bādhyam*.
34 Pā I 1. 16.
35 ibid VI 1. 117.
36 ibid. VII. 4. 38.
37. This rule could not be traced
38 Vā. on Pā. VI. 1. 77
यणादेशः प्लुतपूर्वस्य च दीर्घशाकलप्रतिषेधार्थम् ।
39. MB on Pā. I. 1. 6, Vā. 1 : दृष्टानुविधित्वाच्च छन्दसः ।
40. See f. n. 29 *supra*

tion could only be that 'a merit will emerge by the usage of words similar to those which are derived here; and a demerit by the usage of words other than these'.[41]

15. That is why in the context of *taddhita* when the author of the *Vrtti* made a statement to the effect that (the correctness of words is to be determined) by following the usage of the righteous,'[42] the author of the *Padamañjarī* said:

'[If it be asked] what is then the grammar for, the answer is this: After knowing the [correct] words given in the grammar and noticing the persons who use them in the right way, one understands that 'these persons are the righteous'. This leads to the knowledge that their usages other than those [found in the grammar] are also to be accepted. So the grammar is for recognizing the righteous'.[43] Therefore [the contention] that the grammatical rules are restrictive is set aside.

> 16. Further, if it is maintained that the words of those (i.e., the three sages) are powerful because of the statement of *Bhāṣya*, etc., then it would be easier to say 'my word is authoritative because it is said by me'.

17. Thus it is proved that there is no verbal testimony either superhuman or human teaching the non-authority of other grammars. This is what is meant by 'those who know much do not speak without base'. The sense is that the author of the *Bhāṣya*, etc., who know much would not make a baseless statement amounting to the non-authority of other grammars and the authority of their own words, because it (such a statement) is vitiated by self-dependence. Even if there be, in certain cases, an adverse criticism of other grammars, it is only for the pleasure of reasoning. Further, more than a hundred of aphorisms like 'here up to the end of the rules referring to the name *bham* [the rules are] as if they have not operated',[44] though nullified by the *Bhāṣya* have not been discared. So the science of grammar is objective.

18 [Objection:] The authority of the words of the three sages alone and the non-authority of other-grammars are proved by [the means of] Presumption, as otherwise the acceptance of the former alone by the majority [of scholars] could not be well accounted for.

41 MB vol. I. p. 8. Vā. 1: लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमः; *Vākyapadīya*, I. 140.

42 K. VI 3. 109.

43. The quotation is not here verbal. Also see MB on Pā. VI. 3 109.

44. Pā VI 4. 22.

[Answer:] This is not correct. The acceptance by the majority can be accounted for by the reason of [their] having the special merits of clarity, brevity, etc. Because of this it is impossible to prove the non-authority of others. Otherwise, because among the works on Logic, *Maṇi*[45] alone is accepted by the majority, the works like *Kusumāñjali*[46], *Kiraṇāvali*[47], the *Bhāṣya* of Pakṣila[48], etc., would be non-authoritative. In the field of grammar also for the reason that Kaiyaṭa's gloss has been accepted by many the glosses of Bhartṛhari, etc., should be non-authoritative. Similarly because among the moral codes that of Manu, among the *Purāṇas* the *Bhāgavata*, and among the *Śikṣās* that which belongs to Śaunaka are accepted by many, other works [in these fields] would be non-authoritative; and saying so you would become the foremost among those who do not follow the *Vedas*. That the works of Paninian school have special merit is acceptable to us also. What is not acceptable is only the non-authority of others. By this the argument that the grammar of Pāṇini alone is authoritative because it is the one that has been accepted in interpreting the *Mīmāṃsā*[49], etc., is also refuted. It is quite reasonable that it is accepted in the *Mīmāṃsā*, etc., because it is well known for its merits. By this there is no room for presuming non-authority for others. This is what is meant by [the statement] 'that more people prefer a thing is due to its merits'.

19. Moreover, he who argues as shown above will have to say how the correct usage of words existed before Pāṇini. It can never be said that there was no usage of correct words at that time; for [in that case], as there could be no correctness [of usages] through *ūha*. etc., there would have been confusion in the performance of all rituals,[50] all would have also gone to hell by the usage of incorrect words,[51] all would have also become barbarous.[52] It cannot be maintained that at that time people knew the correct words without a grammar; for there is the injunction of the *śruti* that 'a *brāhmaṇa* should study and understand the *Veda* including its six auxiliaries without any motive',[53] and (if there were no grammar) due to the non-study of the six auxiliaries in their

45. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.
46. An independent work of Udayana.
47. Commentary on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* by Udayana.
48. Otherwise known as Vātsyāyana
49. Śabara in commenting on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* and Kumārila on Śabara's *Bhāṣya*, etc
50. See MB, vol. I, p. 1 where *ūha* is one of the purposes of the study of grammar.
51. ibid. p. 2. under *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ* '*yas tu prayuṅkte*'.
52. ibid. म्लेच्छा मा भूमेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् ।
53. ibid. p. 1

entirety all should be non-*brāhmaṇas*. Nor there is any statement to the effect that at that time only five auxiliaries were to be studied, or that the work of Pāṇini alone is the auxiliary (of the *Veda*) What the author of the *Bhāṣya* too, repeatedly says is: 'therefore grammar is to be studied',[54] not 'Paninian grammar is to be studied'. Therefore, because prior to the Paninian grammar other grammars alone were accepted by many, their authority arising from such acceptance, which is otherwise inexplicable, cannot be prevented.

20 Moreover, if we prove the authority of something for the reason of its being accepted by many, the works prior to Pāṇini would become superior for the simple fact that formerly those works alone were accepted by many and are wide-spread even now, but the work of Pāṇini is accepted by many only now because it was not available in older times.

21. [Objection :] Although the older works were previously authoritative, after the advent of the work of Pāṇini their authority faded away.
[Answer:] This cannot be so.

> How could the authoritativeness of those which were once authoritative be obliterated by the efflux of time? If it could be, even *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, etc.. might loose their authority at some time

That is why not caring for the open statement by somebody that 'the *dharma* instructed by Manu (prevails)[55] but in the *Kṛtayuga*', in the *Kaliyuga* too the words of Manu are cited as authority. So authority does not fade away by the efflux of time. There can indeed be a variation in acceptance due to the variation in merit. This is what is meant by 'how was it before Pāṇini'.

22. In this way when the lack of reason for the non-authority (of the non-Paninian works) is established, the authority of those works is to be established by [the reasoning] 'those who know much do not say without base'. [That is to say] the words of Candra and others are authoritative, because they are words having some basis, like those of Pāṇini', 'their words have some basis because they are the words of those who know much, just like those (of Pāṇini). 'they do know much because they are the authors of the scientific treatises just like Pāṇini'.

54. ibid pp. 1-4. more than ten times. तस्माद्ध्येयं व्याकरणम् ।
55 *Parāśara-smṛti*, I. 24

23. Without knowing many sides of what is to be said nobody would attempt to write a scientific treatise. And even if somebody attempts, he would become a victim of redicule. Therefore, for the reasons that even those (non-Paninian) authors renowned for their scientific treatises must be knowing the extension of the science of language, and that there is no room to suspect them of mistake or deception and if there be, such a suspicion could hardly be ruled out in respect of Pāṇini also, it is evident that the other (non-Paninian) grammars are also authoritative because of their being written by trust-worthy persons.

24. [Objection :] We say that the other grammars have no authority because they do not serve any purpose inasmuch as the usages of the righteous can be vindicted by [the method of] implications, etc , found in the work of Pāṇini.

[Answer :] This is also not so. For, in certain instances seeing the usage the rules are to be assumed while in certain (other) instances seeing the rules the usage is to be assumed - this much is undisputed even by those who follow Pāṇini's grammar with avowed fidelity. As such when a usage is found accepted by the righteous it is to be explained by implication, etc. But in the instance of *kathāpayati*, etc., where the rule (for the usage) is found only in other grammars[56], how could there be non-authority [of other grammars] on the ground that they have no purpose to serve. Moreover, even in the case of the usages *viśrāma*, etc., accepted by the righteous, the relevant rules are clearly found in other grammars. Therefore the assumption of implications, etc , by force, becomes cumbersome. In spite of this [fact] with a desire to display one's self-confidence and an intention to paying one's respects to the three sages, if such usages are vindicated by resort-to implications, etc., we only welcome it. But this cannot mean that the other grammars do not serve any purpose or wield any authority. Let us stop this here.

25. Further, the authority of the ancient teachers is acceptable to Pāṇini and others. For example, in the rules '*āṅi cāpaḥ*',[57] '*auṅa āpaḥ*',[58] etc., the technical names accepted by the ancient teachers are directly maintained. In [the rules] 'According to Śākaṭāyana

56. i.e , that of Śākaṭāyana

57. Pā. VII. 3. 105. *āṅ* is the name for the instrumental singular according to the pre-Paninian grammars.

58. ibid. VII 1 18 *auṅ* stands for the dual number of both nominative and accusative. This *saṃjñā* is taken from the ancients.

(the sounds) *va* and *ya* may be pronounced with less stress',[59] 'According to Āpiśali [the rule is] optional when a nominal verb follows'[60], 'Bhāguri desires an elision of the *a* in the prefixes *ava* and *api*'[61], views of the ancient teachers are also directly expressed. A rule does not become optional by simply mentioning the names of the ancient teachers, only when their view is recognized as 'this is their view and this is mine', the rule could be optional. Moreover, after criticising what is said by the ancient teachers, in the instances 'this (i.e., concord of gender and number) need not be ruled because it has the authority of conventional term'[62], 'elision [need not also be ruled] because of the noncurrency of the etymological meaning'[63], in the rules like 'when meaning the kingdom [these affixes] elide'[64] Pāṇini clearly accepts the words of the ancient teachers which were once criticised. By this it is understood that even though in certain cases for the sake of the pleasure of reasoning criticisms are offered, the words of the ancient teachers are nevertheless acceptable.

26. In this way since Pāṇini accepts even that which is criticised by himself, if elsewhere in the commentaries, etc., the view of the ancient teachers is found criticised, it is only for the pleasure of displaying self-confidence in argumentation. Let this be understood as such by the learned. Pāṇini has not, therefore, indicated the rejection [of others' words.]

Therefore he who accepts the authority of what is said by Pāṇini alone has [necessarily] to accept the authority of older texts also because they are accepted by him (Pāṇini). This is what is meant by 'Pāṇini also quotes what is said by his predecessors'.

27. Moreover, it is said that 'this tradition of grammer is without a beginning'[65] so it is to be maintained that Pāṇini wrote his treatise after considering the previous grammars as his source. The example, 'treatise of Pāṇini' [66] is given under the rule 'enounced by him' [67] and not under '(in the meaning of) a book made on [a subject]'[68].

59. ibid. VIII. 3 18
60 ibid. VI. 1 92
61 Though this is not found in MB, *Rūpāvatāra* and *Prakriyā-kaumudī* quote this See vol I p 131 and vol. I, p. 317, respectively
62 Pā. I 2 53.
63 ibid 1. 2. 54.
64 ibid IV. 2 81
65 See *Vākyapadīya*, I. 142, 145.
66. MB vol I, p 12 · पाणिनिना प्रोक्तं पाणिनीयम् ।
67 Pā IV 3 101. See also K.
68. ibid IV 3. 116.

So it is understood that P ā ṇ i n i only enounced the science of grammar with a different type of technical precision and did not himself invent it. Therfore, he who says that the previous treatises do not have authority because they are non-Paninian is virtually proving that the treatise of P ā ṇ i n i does not have authorlty because it does not have any source. In this way the demolishment of all grammars is brought about by the great grammarian that you are.

28. [Objection :] Because P ā ṇ i n i made his rules after considering the ancient treatises as well as the usages and removing those deserving rejection, what is not said by P ā ṇ i n i is indeed to be rejected. [Answer :] This cannot be. If what is not said by P ā ṇ i n i is to be rejected, it amounts to the rejection of what is explained by the *Vārttika* too. It cannot also be said that although the authors of the *Sūtras* and the *Vārttika* are not omniscient, there cannot be any doubt about the omniscience of the venerable author of the *Bhāṣya*, who is verily Śeṣa himself,[69], and what is not said by him is to be rejected, for even though he knows every thing, it is possible that he has not said every thing because there is no end of the things to be said.[70] Otherwise, why should he determine the *ākṛtigaṇa*, etc. This is sufficient for the present

29. It is, therefore, to be concluded as below :

> The son of Dākṣī[71] explained [the science of grammar] after considering several [previous] treatises along with the usages, those [points] which were left out by him were explained by K ā t y ā y a n a ; the sage P a t a ñ j a l i explained those that were not noticed by K ā t y ā y a n a ; and what is not said even by him is explained by B h o j a and others after seeing some of the usages and [also] the ancient treatises.

Therefore it is evident that the authority of the ancient treatises which were the source for P ā n i n i's work cannot be questioned. This is what is meant by 'P ā ṇ i n i also quotes what is said by his predecessors'

30. [Objection :] Let it be as said above in the instances where there is no disagreement, but where there is a disagreement [of other works] with what is said by P ā ṇ i n i, what is said in other treatises should become nullified.

69 Ananta, the thousand-tounged mythical serpant.

70. cf. MB vol. I, p 5. अनभ्युपाय एव शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठः - *Prakriyā Kaumudī*, vol II, p. 794: आनन्त्यात् सर्वशब्दा हि न शक्यन्तेऽनुशासितुम् ।

71. cf MB. vol I, p. 75: सर्वे सर्वपदादेशा दाक्षीपुत्रस्य पाणिनेः ।

[Answer:] This is not correct. For, the fact that they cannot be nullified has come to stay on account of their having authority. As in the case of 'the offering of the oblations after the sun rise or before the sun rise'[72] and, 'in taking up or not taking up the *ṣoḍaśigraha*,'[73] here also an alternative alone is to be assumed. That is why in the *Smṛticandrikā*[74] and other works, at many places, where a disagreement between the statements by the authors of moral codes is found, both (views) are maintained acceptable as alternatives

> In many places by mentioning the [names of] ancient teachers for the sake of making the rule optional,[75] Pāṇini verily indicates that in case of a difference in views both are to be accepted (as alternatives).

31. [Objection:] Because two treatises speak of the correctness and incorrectness for the same word, actually there are no two words; so it is proper [in such cases] to maintain a conflict; and as such there is no possibility of an alternative, as in the case of 'the taking up or not taking up (of the *ṣoḍaśigraha*)'.
[Answer:] This cannot stand. No treatise instructs [us of] the incorrectness of what is said by another treatise. We are only instructed by way of showing the direction that the words which are not accounted for by rules or usages of the righteous are incorrect. This is already said at the time of criticising the view that the (Paninian) rules are restrictive. Moreover, the taking up of or not taking up *ṣoḍaśī* is also enjoined by the two rules maintaining it to be a cause of either an *unseen* [merit] or an offence. So, to the question how in this case there could at least be an optional activity for those who resort to *śruti,* there must be an answer; and the same answer will hold good here too. Thus it is proved that even if there be an appearance of conflict, either (alternative) is to be accepted. This is what is meant by 'even in the case of a conflict an alternative is to be assumed'.

32. Further there can be no conflict between the words of Pāṇini and others. In the informative aphorisms there cannot be any restriction that 'this suffix is added only to these stems'; for there can be no restriction with regard to something which is not previously known.[76] Nor can a restriction be presumed on the ground of the maxim 'all statements are emphatic (in their meaning)', for the emphasis is even

72. *Kāuṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, II. 7. ९६.
73. *Maitrāyaṇīya-saṃhitā*, IV. 7 6.
74 The well known work of Devaṇabhaṭṭa
75 Pā VIII. 3 19, etc.
76. cf. सिद्धे आरभ्यमाणो नियमाय ।

possible for the exclusion of what is not previously known. Otherwise there would be no room for the two types of rules, informative and restrictive. Therefore in the case of informative rules there can be no conflict with other rules even if they contain something extra. And in the case of an aphorism which is restrictive by way of its being an exception to the general rule, there can be no conflict [with others] even if others say something extra; because there is the [accepted] maxim, 'In some places even in the realm of an exception the general rule can operate'[77].

33. It is not to be maintained that where Pāṇini says 'no' while others 'yes' there will be a conflict; for by [the maxim] 'those' [rules] which are conveyed by the method of implication or inclusion in a *gaṇa* or expression of a 'no' are not peremptory'[78], it is stated that what is conveyed by [the expression] 'no' is not peremptory, so it (what is conveyed by 'no') cannot be in conflict with others. Nor can it be said that there can be a conflict with the arguments advanced in the *Bhāṣya*, etc. For,

> The arguments are based on the technical maxims and technical maxims are obtained through implications. Those which are conveyed by implications are optional; and those which are optional cannot be conflicting.
>
> If the [correct] words were to be known through reasoning alone their correctness will be thrown into confusion. Therefore the wise prove the [correctness of] words depending upon firm usages and ancient grammars even while reasoning is employed. That is why in maintaining [the correctness of] a word by reasoning, the consideration of the speaker arises.[79] Therefore when those are enlightened in the language prove a word in two ways by their reasoning, both are to be accepted because both of them have some basis And the absence of a conflict has already been explained.

34. [Objection:] In certain places even without an implication the reasoning is expressly conveyed as in the case of the aphorism, 'When

77. MB on Pā. VII. 4. 82. (Vā. 2) अनभ्यासविकारेष्वपवादा उत्सर्गान् न वाधन्त इत्येषा परिभाषा कर्तव्या।

78. See *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* ज्ञापकसिद्धं न सर्वत्र (125), नञ्घटितमनित्यम् (987), गणकार्यमनित्यम् (96) PS, *Nyāyakhaṇḍa:* समासान्तागमसंज्ञाज्ञापक-गणनञ् निर्दिष्टायनित्यानि ।

79. Namely, whether he is trustworthy (*āpta*) or not.

rules of equal force are in conflict with each other, the latter [in the order] is to take effect'[80]; and in such cases there will be a conflict as it (i e., what is expressly conveyed) is not optional.
[Answer:] This is not correct; because even in the case of an express statement, it has been previously pointed out that there is no conflict betweeen the affirmative and negative points. Therefore, all grammars are equally authoritative as they are not in conflict with each other. This is what is meant by the word 'even' in (the phrase) 'even if there be a conflict' which indicates that there can be no conflict.

35. [Objection.] Now let it be that the ancient grammars are authoritative because they are the compositions of sages. But how could one speak of the authority for the words of B h o j a , B o p p a d e v a , etc., who belong to the later times.
[Answer:] Even to this (objection) we say those who know much do not speak without basis'. B h o j a , etc., who definitely know much because of their interpretation of all the rules found in the *Bhāsya*, etc., must have composed their treatises depending upon other rules and the usages of competent people; therefore, those (works) also indeed have authority just like the works of P ā ṇ i n i and others. In holding that in the grammar of the trinity of sages there is the gradation of authority in the order of sequence, the reason for such gradation should be nothing but 'knowing much more'. For, it is not proper to assume an unseen reason when a seen one is feasible, And such a 'knowing much more' is equally possible with B h o j a and others also. Therefore, they deserve indeed special respect.

36. The clause beginning with 'those who know much' has another meaning also Those who know much will not make the baseless statement that other grammars are not authoritative Even V i d y ā r a ṇ y a , who definitely knows more when compared to these persons have not said so Therefore only due to lack of acquaintance with many treatises this opponent prattles without any base and sense of shame; so he deserves nothing but ridicule

> Through argumentations certain persons attempt to prove the ancient grammars baseless; and proclaim them unacceptable [although] the trinity of sages has not repudiated them. The fact is that many people accept this (the grammar of

80. Pā. I 4 2

the three sages) because it has more merits when compared with others; that is why this person mistakes all other treatises to be false.

37. In this way, by establishing the authority of other grammars though the attempt of the opponent to establish their non-authority has been implicitely washed out, his arguments will be repudiated now by showing detailed reasons.

38. It has been said (by the opponent) that Śaṅkarācārya and others while interpreting the revealed texts have accepted Paninian grammar alone; so it alone is authoritative. The other grammars do not have authority because they are not accepted for the sake of interpreting [the revealed texts].

This is flimsy. Even Śankarācārya, Murāri and others have accepted other grammars as the basis of their usages. The acceptance or non-acceptance for the sake of interpretation is due to their (i.e., the grammars) being known more widely or less; they (i.e., the acceptance or non-acceptance) do not serve in establishing authority or non-authority. The argument itself that they (i.e., the other grammars) are not accepted for the purpose of interpretation is not correct; for Vidyāraṇya while considering the word *kathāpayati*, the author of *Prasāda*[81] in many places of his commentary, Viśveśvara – the commentator on *Naiṣadha*[82] – in interpreting the word *alpamedhas*, Kṣīrasvāmī,[83] Sarvānanda[84] and the author of the *Subodhinī*[85] in interpreting the Lexicon of Amarasimha have accepted them (i.e., the other grammar) in the course of their commentaries. The commentator on the Vedic Lexicon[86] has accepted the aphorisms of Bhoja throughout. And in the age before Pāṇini their authority alone has to be accepted. It has been already said that there is no reason for the fading away of the authority once established.

81. Viṭṭhala, the commentator on the *Prakriyākaumudī*

82 *Padavākyārth.pañcikā*, Adyar Library, MS. No 68474. Descriptive Catalogue, vol. V, S. No. 174 On leaf No. 128 · मन्दाल्पाभ्यां च मेधाद् इति महोपाध्याय-वर्धमानस्सू(सू)त्रम्।

83 The Commentary is called *Amarakaśodghāṭana* Edn Poona, 1913, 1943.

84 The commentary is called *Ṭīkāsarvasvam*. The author belonged to the Vandighatīya family and the work was composed in 1160 A D.

85. This is a very elaborate commentary on the *Amarakośa* by Jātaveda-dīkṣita, son of Devanabhaṭṭa. The author is supposed to have flourished in the latter part of the twelfth century.

86. Durgācārya, the commentator on the *Nirukta* of Yāska.

39. Then it is said (by the opponent) that the other grammars are to be rejected because of their conflict with what is said by the trinity of sages, whose rules are restrictive that 'these alone are correct words'. This [argument] has also been set aside by refuting in more than one way the restrictive nature [of Paninian rules] advanced by the opponent. The reason is also shown that if the Paninian rules are restrictive, the *vārttikas* would also become non-authoritative. The argument that where there is a conflict between two views either alone must be accepted is also shown as inconclusive in the instances of 'the taking up or not taking up of *ṣoḍaśī*' and of the alternatives put forth by two moral codes as represented in the *Smṛticandrikā*, etc. That there is no conflict because of the absence of restriction (in Paninian rules) is also affirmed.

40. [The opponents' view] that the usages of V y ā s a are based on the special grammars called *Prātiśākhyas*, is also not correct. Because it has already been pointed out that when both are equal in respect of their being non-Paninian, there is no reason to favour the special grammars and hate the general ones. In addition, it will be hardly possible in the view of the opponent to maintain the authority of the *Prātiśākhyas*, inasmuch as (according to him) the rules (of P ā ṇ i n i) on the Vedic language have already laid down the restriction that 'these [usages] alone are correct in the *Vedas*'.

41. Then it has been said that since the references to the names of ancient teachers can be explained by assuming the purpose of making the rules optional, their authority has not been accepted. This is also not true. While saying 'this is my view and this is his', if the authority of the other is not accepted, there can be no alternative at all; so it is self-contradictory. By simple mentioning of the name [of the teachers] the rule cannot become optional; and if [their] authority is not accepted, there is no question of maintaining them (i.e., the references) as indicating reverence.

42 Then it has been argued that this (i.e., references to ancient teachers) can happen as is found in the *Mīmāṃsā*, etc., where the names of unacceptable predecessors are (some times) mentioned. This is also not sound; for there the other's view is mentioned for criticising it; whereas here there is no such thing. [The argument] that though in (the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*) – *tatpramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt.*[87] the other's view is mentioned as acceptable, while discussing the deities

87. *Jaimini-sūtra*, I. 1. 5.

having a body, etc.,[88] other's view is rejected; so here (in the case of grammar) also the same can happen is un-sound. For there also all the schools of the Vedists are found to have been accepted as different views.

43. It has also been said that the author of the *Kaumudī* and others have quoted the views of others in order to reveal the expansion of their own intellect, and not because of others' authority. This [argument] lacks coherence. By quoting something which is not authoritative, the dullness of the intellect alone could be revealed. Thus in the opponent's contention those points which go against what we have said are refuted.

Therefore, every thing is fine; because V a i n a t e y a! who by citing a multitude of others' works only establishes what I have said, is indeed, a very close friend of mine.

O! the renowned scholars of the celebrated Coḷa region! someone declared the other grammars (than that of P ā ṇ i n i) to be devoid of authority; thereupon we also said something as above. Since this (what I have said) has been enounced in the [works like] *Kaumudī* and *Dhātuvṛtti* on the basis of their (i.e., the other grammars) being equally an auxiliary to the *Veda* (as the Pāninian grammar), I have written down this with the hope that this would be acceptable to you. O! the eminent [scholars]! you may kindly scrutinize this.

O! Śrī Someśvaradīkṣita![89] the foremost among the learned! O! the erudite in both the *Mīmāṃsās*, grammar and logic! having heard of you as one of invincible nobility knowing the truth (of things), a reservoir of kindness and well composed, I entreat: Here is something written by me: you, the high-minded, may kindly accept this.

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88. ibid. X. 4. 23. Although Jaimini does not explicitely say that deities to whom oblations are offered do not have a physique, Śabara states: नन्वेवं शब्द एव देवता प्राप्नोति। अत्रोच्यते। नैतदस्माभिः परिहर्तव्यम्। न हीदमुच्यमानमस्मत्पक्षं बाधते। Also see Khaṇḍadeva on this
cf *Naiṣadhīya-carita*, V 39

विश्वरूपकलनादुपपन्नं तस्य जैमिनिमुनित्वमुदीये।
विग्रहं मखभुजामसहिष्णुर्व्यर्थतां मदशनिं स निनाय॥

89. He is yet to be identified.

You have written (it is known), the counter arguments in the *Kāmadevavijaya*[90]. We are extremely anxious to see it. It may therefore be immediately sent (to us). The idea [of this request] is that seeing the method of argumentation set forth by the clearsighted [scholars] like you, we may get our thoughts clarified at once.

When Kāmadeva[91] employed the reasoning (*also* directed the weapon)[92] its (*also* his) destruction was effected by you through effective observations (*also* glance).[93] This is indeed proper for one who owns the name *someśvara* and is omniscient.

There is the god who having armoured himself well protects the king of serpents, who was pushed aside by your erudition, by placing him as a bracelet; and the divine river who was cast away by the force of your oration, by placing her in his matted hair. In this way, O! the learned Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita! you steal away, by your intelligence, the pride of of omniscience of even that god, who affords protection to your enemies.[94]

The King who is extensively learned in Politics depends on you to take decision in the matters concerning the country; when renowned scholars assemble with some doubt, you alone stand as the judge; who, even if he be equal to the preceptor of the gods, can stand up to you?[95] O! Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīksita! can any other person who equals you in wisdom be found ?

90. According to *The New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol III, p. 348 *Kāmadeva-vijaya* is a work on grammar written by Someśvara in reply to a work by Kāmadeva

91. An author of that name as well as the god of love.

92. The word *hetau* is taken here as the *saptami* of *hetu* with reference to the author Kāmadeva and *hetu* with referenee to Kāmadeva (god of love)

93. Someśvara Dīkṣita retaliated the arguments of the author Kāmadeva by critical observations, while God Śiva destroyed Kāmadeva by His glance.

94. The thousand-tongued mythical serpent is supposed to be having infinite knowledge. The power of speech is always compared to the force of current of Gaṅgā. The idea seems to be that Śiva is protecting them without knowing of their defeat at Yajñanārāyaṇa's hands. The knowledge of the scholar, therefore, surpasses that of the God.

95. The root *sthā* in *ātmanepada* is used here in its various meanings In the first and second instances, it is according to Pā. I 3. 23 *Prakāśana-stheyākhyayoś ca* PS under ibid , states that Bhaṭṭi, etc , interpret the word *stheya* as one who depends on others for taking a decision or who himself is the judge when others seek a decision. Here the root is used in both the senses, respectively The third sense 'to stand upto' is found in the third usage of the root in the verse.

The people in Kerala in general are very delicate and sickly, and especially so is my humble self. Everyone is lukewarm towards travelling even a distance; what about then going to another region? In spite of this, if by chance at some time health would allow me to have it, I will certainly meet the great scholar Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita, the ocean of wisdom.

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